Introduction
In the period since the fall of Communism and the dissolution of Yugoslavia the administrative structure in the Adriatic space has changed signifi cantly: four new states have emerged, and most of the transformation countries have adopted a new subnational administrative structure.
The following contribution concentrates on (1) identifying the develop ments that have taken place since the political turn-around in 1989/90, (2) presenting the current organi sational structure of the administration together with its institutions, competencies and fi nancing methods and (3) illustrating the successes as well as the diffi culties of the decentralisation process. Fur thermore, it appears of importance to (4) briefl y highlight the cultural and administrative traditions, in order to promote a better understanding of the current situation.
It will focus on the transformation countries of the Adriatic space, i.e. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania, while the situation in Italy, which had decentralized its administrative structures already earlier, will only briefl y be outlined.
For a better understanding, the following defi nitions of terms shall provide a preface.
The term territorial-administrative unit describes a juridical person of the public administration with a territorially defi ned sphere of operation. This defi nition does not include planning regions, develop ment regions or statistical regions, which -as a rule -do not have their own legal personality and are merely regional or local institutions that are com bined for a particular purpose. They are dependent either on the constitutive territorial-administrative units, or on the central offi ces at state level. Territorial-administrative units are always endowed with executive authority, and in some cases they also have legislative (law-making) authority.
Executive authority is understood to mean the mandate to implement laws within their own terri torial sphere of operation as well as the freedom to act within the framework of the operational sphere designated by law and within the available budget.
Legislative authority is understood as the mandate to pass laws. Where subordinated territorial-admi nistrative units are endowed with this mandate, it is usually attached to the condition that laws passed by this territorial-administrative unit shall not contravene the legislation of superordinate territorial-administrative units.
The principle of subsidiarity is understood to be a political guideline that allows those duties, which can be carried out by a subordinate territorial-ad ministrative unit, to actually be performed by these, by bestowing the required powers.
This requires a process of (administrative) decentrali sation in the sense of a transfer of administrative competencies from superordinate to subordinate territorialadministrative units. As a rule, the com petencies are shifted from the state level to territorial-administrative units located at the regio nal and local level. So that the term "decentrali sation" can be properly applied, these territorial-administrative units must be self-governing and are therefore politically accountable for wielding this authority.
Self-government exists when the citizens of an administrative unit govern themselves through the institutions they directly elected. In other words, as a precondition, the policy-makers within the terri torial-administrative units must be eligible for direct election, upon which they accept the political re sponsibility towards the local electorate. Depending on the size of the territorial-administrative unit concerned, it is referred to as regional or local self-government.
In the relatively rare instances of delegated self-government the functionaries of a superordinate ad ministrative institution are not elected directly, but are instead provided by directly elected institutions of a subordinate territorial-administrative unit.
Self-government must be distinguished from decon centrated and delegated state administration. Neither corresponds to the principles of subsidiarity and decentralisation.
Deconcentrated state administration signifi es that territorial-administrative units assume state compe tencies on a regional or local level, doing so on behalf of the state and with accountability towards state institutions. In this case, territorialadministra tive units act as outposts of central state administra tion. On the one hand, they provide state admi nistration services that are spatially deconcentrated and therefore more accessible to citizens. On the other hand, on behalf of the state, they can also have the function of controlling and monitoring those territorial-administrative units acting as sub sidiaries.
In the case of delegated state administration, self-governing territorialadministrative units assume public competencies on behalf of the state and with accountability towards state institutions. Frequently only one institution belonging to a territorial-administrative unit that otherwise acts as a subsidiary, will take on these competencies.
Regionalisation in the administrative sense is under stood to mean the subdivision of a state into larger territorial-administrative units that are not attri butable to the local level. It always applies across the entire national territory. The functional mode of the territorial-administrative unit plays no part here (self-government, deconcentrated state administra tion, delegated state administration). This is to be distinguished from regionalism in the sense of efforts that use the means of political or ganisation and exertion of infl uence in order to obtain special privileges for a specifi c administra tive region vis-à-vis the central authority of the state. The objective here is to achieve a privileged status compared with the rest of the state.
Re gionalism is usually justifi ed by citing historical, cultural, linguistic, religious or national/ethnic char acteristics.
Italy [Italia]
1 Italy is at the fi rst administrative level below the state divided into 20 regions [regione] , of which 15 have an ordinary statute and 5 are autonomous regions with a special statute (see Figure 1) . They correspond to the NUTS-2 level and were In rectangular brackets with the fi rst mentioning of a name its offi cial endonymic version in the fi rst case singular is given. established in 1970. Since the constitutional reform of 2001 they have not only executive, but also legislative powers. Their fi nancial autonomy, however, is rather restricted and confi ned to levying taxes for the maintenance of the health system. Regions correspond -as a rule -to the historical components of Italy having enjoyed sovereign statehood or some kind of autonomy in various periods before Italy's unifi cation between 1860 and 1870 or -in the case of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol//Trentino-Südtirol, to some extent also Friuli-Venezia Giulia/Friûl-Vignesie Julie -to later acquisitions after World War I. They also coincide roughly with the catchment areas of macro-regional centres. [presidente] . The latter is directly elected by the citizens of each region, with the exceptions of the Aosta Valley and Trentino-Alto Adige, where he/ she is chosen by the regional council. The president chairs the government, nominates and dismisses its members [assessori] .
Autonomous regions
In Trentino-Alto Adige, the regional council is composed of the joint session of the two provincial councils of Trentino and South Tyrol, and the regional president is one of the two provincial presidents.
The 110 provinces [provincia] of Italy (see Figure 1 ) correspond to the NUTS-3 level as well as -in general -to the catchment area of meso-regional centres and have three main functions: local planning and zoning, provision of local police and fi re services, transportation regulation (car registration, maintenance of local roads, etc.). Each province is headed by an elected president [presidente] , assisted by the elected provincial council [consiglio provinciale] and an executive body, the provincial executive [giunta provinciale]. The executive is chaired by the president, who appoints its other members [assessori] . These representatives of regional self-government are balanced by a prefect [prefetto] , who is appointed by the central government and heads the prefecture [prefettura] as an outpost of the central government. Thus, unlike the exclusively self-governing level of regions, at the level of provinces self-government and deconcentrated state administration are combined.
Trentino and South Tyrol are autonomous provinces with the legislative powers of regions. They are not subordinated to their region, but constituent parts of it.
The roughly 8,100 Italian communes [comune] correspond to the NUTS-5 level and are headed by a mayor [sindaco] assisted by a legislative body, the communal council [consiglio comunale], and an executive body, the giunta comunale. Mayor and the members of the communal council are elected by public vote. The giunta comunale is chaired by the mayor, who appoints others members [assessori] . Thus, communes enjoy exclusive self-government.
A commune usually consists of a principal town or village and other areas called fractions [frazione] . Only recently, fractions have been administratively upgraded by the implementation of fraction councils [consiglio di frazione], a local government representing the inhabitants of a fraction at the communal level.
So it may be justifi ed to say that Italy has from the 1970s developed from a unitarian centralised state into a decentralised country with self-government at all three (including fractions even four) subnational administrative levels, of which only the provincial level has deconcentrated state administration in addition. Both regional administrative levels coincide very well with historical-cultural as well as gravitational units.
Slovenia [Slovenija]

Cultural and administrative traditions
Slovenia fi rst emerged as a political entity in 1945, when it became a constituent republic of the federal Communist state of Yugoslavia. Prior to this, Slovenes only existed as an ethnic and linguistic category, which was dispersed across several countries and administrative units and which was dominated by majority populations or elites that belonged to other ethnic and cultural groups (with the limited exception of Yugoslavia during the inter-war years). The dominance by a variety of other cultures moulded Slovenian culture in dif ferent ways and left its traces in the cultural land scape, in regional identities and in the regional consciousness.
The 
Developments after 1991 and the current administrative-territorial system
The fi rst administrative reform to take place in independent Slovenia on 3.10.1994 re placed the 62 communes with an average area of 336 sq.km and an average population of 28,000 with 147 communes [občina] with an average of 138 sq.km and 13,000 inhabitants. Consequently, they no longer corresponded to the NUTS-4 level (as the former greater communes had done), but to the NUTS-5 level instead. They too, were self-governing. By 1.1.2007 their number had been aug mented in several stages (8.8.1998: 192, 15.6.2002: 193, 14.3.2006: 205, 14.6.2006: 210) to reach 210, gradually reducing the average area to 96 sq.km and the average population to 9,400. 11 of these are urban communes [mestna občina], these being Celje, Koper/Capodistria, Kranj, Ljubljana, Maribor, Murska Sobota, Nova Gorica, Novo Mesto, Ptuj, Slovenj Gradec and Velenje. Urban and other kinds of communes are each endowed with the same competencies.
The communes are defi ned as the basic local self-governing units according to the Constitution of 1991 and in the Local Government Act (72/1993) . Following the Constitution their number can only be increased up to a total of 300. The institutions of the communes (see Figure 2) Communal revenues are sourced primarily from taxes and rates. Communes in peripheral areas, which are not able to fi nance themselves exclusively with self-generated revenues, receive state transfer payments in the way of disparity equalisation.
Simultaneously more or less with the new com munes (4.10.1994), 50 so-called "administrative units" [upravna enota] were also established (see Figure 2 and 3) . To a large extent they correspond to the territories of the former larger communes, and thus also to the NUTS-4 level, and they represent deconcentrated state administration by offering spatially dispersed governmental administrative services. They are led by a governor [načelnik] , who is a civil servant. To date, self-government has not been established at the regional level, even though the Constitution allows for this option and related discussions began as early as 1991. One possibility, which is repeat edly mentioned, would be the elevation of the 12 existing statistical regions [statistična regija] (see Table 1 ) to administrative regions [pokrajina] . They correspond to the NUTS-3 level, are largely well matched to the previously mentioned cultural land scapes and their respective subdivisions (e.g. the division of Carniola into Upper Carniola [Gorensko], Inner Carniola [Notransko] and Lower Carniola [Dolensko] ) and also align with the functional terri torial units (VRIŠER 1998) . However, the political parties have been unable to agree upon a solution so far. There is also support for the widely held opinion that a small country such as Slovenia does not require an additional and costly administrative level. A further argument, mentioned less openly, suggests that self-governing regions could release centrifugal forces, if one considers that pronounced regional identities supported by self-government gain gravitas and could pose a threat to the statehood and national unity, which are still young and vulnerable. 
Croatia [Hrvatska]
Cultural and administrative traditions
Similar to Slovenia, Croatia was fi rst established as an administrative unit in the current shape in 1945. Very much in contrast to Slovenia, however, Croatian statehood can be traced back very far into history, in fact to the 9 th century (852). However, this statehood was subject to several interruptions (the last one from 1919 to 1939), referred to shifting territories with shifting heartlands and varied in sovereignty from fully sovereign to a kind of autonomy. What is Croatia today was dominated for long periods by Venice along the Adriatic façade and by Hungary in the interior of the country, and later by Austria (1797 Austria ( -1805 Austria ( , 1813 Austria ( /15-1867 and Austria-Hungary (1867 -1918 in both regions. Long-term territorial fragmentation and divergent rulers, each bringing with them their elites and cultural traditions, as well as late unifi cation resulted, again very similar to Slovenia, in very distinct patterns of historical and cultural regional identities, even though the main dividing line runs between the former countries of the Hungarian Crown and the former "Austrian lands", the latter being successors of the Venetian possessions, which lasted until 1797.
The formerly The former Austrian lands also enjoyed consider able self-governance. With regard to the territory of modern Croatia, they were composed of the Croatian share in the former Austrian Littoral, i.e. Istria [Istra] and the Kvarner, as well as of Dalmatia [Dalmacija] .
While the former Hungarian lands, except Rijeka and the Croatian Coastland, have a rather Pannonian or Central European character, the former Austrian provinces skirting the Adriatic Sea (as well as Rijeka and the Croatian Coastland) feature the results of a pronounced Mediterranean and Venetian infl uence.
In recent times, apart from Serbian separatism, which lead to a de facto secession of areas with a Serbian majority coinciding to a large extent with the former Military Frontier between 1992 and 1995, Istria has displayed the strongest signs of a regional consciousness. This culminated in some endeavours towards autonomy in the early 1990s. In the population census of 1991, for example, 45% of the Istrian population declared ethnic affi liations other than Croatian, while 16% declared a "regional" rather than a national affi liation (see also HEILBORN 1995). Istria had indeed never been part of any Croatian state before 1945.
With the exception of the years 1939-1941, when a Croatian Banate [Hrvatska banovina] was estab lished, neither inter-war Yugoslavia, nor Tito-Yu goslavia after World War II refl ected these histori cal regions in their administrative-territorial structures. From 1967 onward the communes [općina] were enlarged to the size of districts and endowed with considerable powers of self-government, function ing as the only administrative units below the republican level. Ultimately, their number had reached 102. With an average population of 40,000, however, they were too small to function as regions. Mainly for purposes of regional planning, com munes joined associations [zajednica općina]. The entire territory of Croatia was covered by a total of 11 of these communal associations. They were very well aligned with the central place system, though they were not administrative-territorial units in their own right, but merely associations of independent communes for certain purposes.
Developments after 1991 and the current ad ministrative-territorial system
Croatia had declared independence from Yugo slavia together with Slovenia on 25.6.1991, but continued to be troubled by violent confl icts until August 1995 and was burdened with signifi cant refugee, political and economic problems for longer still.
In somewhat of a hurry and presumably also to pre vent discussions, in 1993 Croatia completely re organised its administrative-territorial system based on a Law dated 29.12.1992. It now consisted of 20 counties [županija] at the regional NUTS-3 level, plus the City of Zagreb [Grad Zagreb], which was equated to a county. This was achieved mainly by agglomerating existing communes. At that time, roughly a third of the country was not yet under the control of the Croatian state, but was occupied by the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" ["Republika Srpska Krajina"], neighbouring BosniaHerzegovi na was still in a situation of war and Croatia as such was certainly still in danger of being involved into this war. This may go some way to explain why such a swift and centralistic approach was chosen.
In two counties (the Sisak-Moslavina County [Si sačko-moslavačka županija] and the Zadar-Knin County [Zadarsko-kninska županija]), subordinate self-governing districts [kotar] were established. These were territories with a majority Serbian popu lation. These districts were conceived as an offer to give Serbs in Croatia selforganisation and repre sentation vis-à-vis county and state on the one hand, and on the other hand, because they were subordi nated to counties with a Croatian majority popula tion, they were presumably intended as a mechanism for controlling the Serbs.
After war and violent confl ict had come to an end in Croatia (August 1995), the county system was modifi ed in shape in 1996 and on 7.2.1997. These boundary alterations applied particularly to the territory of the former "Serbian Republic" and the areas around Zagreb. The total number of counties remained the same. Only the two districts conceived for Serbian self-government were abandoned, as the majority of Serbs had been expelled from these areas in 1995, and returned later in much smaller numbers. There have been no further changes to the system of counties. Figure 4 shows the county system in its current form.
The counties are self-governing territorial adminis trative units. Their institutions (see Figure 5) In addition, some state functions are also transferred to the counties.
The counties procure their fi nancing by levying taxes or (in the case of delegated state competen cies) in the form of transfer payments from the state. Transfer payments from the state are also made available for the purpose of socio-economic disparity equalisation, should peripheral and eco nomically weak counties not be able to fi nance their statutory functions through self-generated revenues. Self-government at the county as well as at the local level was substantially reinforced in 2001, when centralistic attitudes prevailing in the Tuđman era (the 1990s) began to make way for other stances.
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Although the county system split up the larger historical and cultural regions mentioned above, and only corresponds to smaller historical and cultural identities in three cases (the Istria County [Istarska županija] corresponds to Istria in the sense of the cultural region, not as a peninsula; the Dubrovnik-Neretva County [Dubrovačko-neretvanska županija] corresponds to the territory of the former city republic Ragusa [Dubrovnik] ; Međimurje County [Međimurska županija] corresponds to the Međimurje region acquired from Hungary in 1919), it has established a kind of regional identity pattern itself in the meantime. It is, in general, well aligned with the central place system at the meso-level (meso-regions).
For these reasons it has so far been able to withstand wider public discussions, which evolved in a more liberal political climate after the end of the Tuđman era (2000) and circled around the replacement of the county system by "real" regions along the lines of historical and cultural units and in the dimensional range of NUTS-2. The most popu lar proposal brought forward encompassed fi ve regions, i. The signifi cant reduction in size was motivated, amongst other things, by the experiences gained previously, i.e. that the former large communes had mainly favoured their centres, while other towns and larger settlements had lost economic activities and inhabitants. Another motive for the reduction in size was, to bring the ad ministration closer to the local population and local interests.
Any settlement with more than 10,000 inhabitants qualifi es as a town in the legal sense. Smaller settle ments can also be declared towns for specifi c historical and economic reasons. A town has an elected council [ In order to fulfi l these functions they can levy their own taxes. National transfer payments support com munes and towns that are fi nancially weaker. Despite a wealth of predictions to the contrary, the regional level of counties, which was hastily imple mented under diffi cult external conditions and pre viously had no tradition in this form, has proved to be surprisingly stable in Croatia. Even though their competencies of self-government have been steadily expanded, they continue to correspond to the cen tralist concept, which formed the foundation for their implementation. This is because they are too small to effectively oppose central government, and they are unable to tap into the regional conscious ness, which is oriented along the lines of the large cultural and historical units.
But it is precisely this regional consciousness combined with the highly varied cultural traditions that drive this state that is still young in years and has a very fragile national identity to push regionalisation forward at this level, rather than at the level of the large cultural-histori cal units. In this context, the small remaining group of Serbs (2001: 4.5%) that is widely scattered, no longer plays a part.
Bosnia and Herzegovina [Bosna i Hercegovina]
Cultural and administrative traditions
Bosnia and Herzegovina fi rst achieved statehood in the High Middle Ages. However, they usually had to acknowledge the supremacy of greater powers, fi rst those of Byzantium, then mainly those of Hungary and fi nally those of the Ottoman Empire. In 1463 the last territorial remnants of Bosnia and Herzegovina fell under direct Ottoman rule. Even under the rule of the Ottoman central state, Bosnia and Herzegovina remained an administrative unit, fi rst as eyalet then, from 1845 as vilayet, in other words: one of the provinces and top-tier administra tive units of the Empire. Unlike the territory inhabited by Albanians, it was not split between several units and can therefore be seen as a political entity with a strong historical identity among the successor states of Yugoslavia. Not until the second, Communist, Yugoslavia with a federalist structure did Bosnia and Herzegovina arise again as constituent republic more or less in the borders of 1918. Compared to 1918, the only small alteration to the border was carried out in the Bay of Kotor [Boka Kotorska] near Herceg Novi, where the country had to hand over a narrow access corridor to Montenegro. Like the other constituent republics, during the period of the second Yugosla vian state, Bosnia and Herzegovina was merely divided into communes [opština/općina]. Ultimate ly, there were 104 of these, and they enjoyed far reaching rights of self-government.
Developments after 1991 and the current ad ministrative-territorial system
When the multinational (Muslim, Serbian, Croatian) 2 Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from Yugoslavia on 5.4.1992, this declaration was followed by a declaration of independence by the "Serbian Republic" ["Republika Srpska"] on 7.4.1992, comprising the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had a Serbian ethnic majority. The "Serbian Republic" also declared war against the Bosnian state with its Muslim ethnic majority, supported by Belgrade, the Yugoslav National Army [Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA] and paramilitary forces from Serbia. The war ended with the Dayton Accord signed on 14.12.1995, following fi rst the diplomatic, then the military intervention of the United States and NATO, as well as successful military operations of Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accord re-established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a united state. It also installed a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) executing the international community's governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Figure 6 ). This Council is composed of 55 countries and agencies and is to last until the country is deemed politically and demo cratically stable. It controls all levels of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina and intervenes if this is found necessary. The executive bodies of PIC are a Steering Board and the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina as the main actor on behalf of the international community.
Based on the Dayton Accord and the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, published as Annex 4 of the Accord, as well as subsequent national legis lation, Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of two "entities" (see Figure 6 and 7): the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina [Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, FBiH] 3 and the Serbian Republic [Republika Srpska, RS] 4 . This was later complemented by the neutral ized District of Brčko [distrikt Brčko] 5 , which is subject to direct jurisdiction of the state and comprises territories of both entities. The District is not a third entity and is therefore indicated in Figure 7 by a hatched area, which extends beyond the border between the two entities.
At Annex 4, Article I, Paragraph 3, under item "Composition [of the state]" the Dayton Accord states: "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herze govina and the Republika Srpska." This suggests that the two entities are not constituent republics of a confederation, but rather subdivisions of a federa tion, although this is not explicitly expressed. The Constitution, on the other hand, specifi cally estab lishes the three nations as constituent elements of the state. Every citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina also has an entity citizenship and vice versa. The borders between the entities are clearly marked, but not controlled. A customs authority as well as a sepa rate postal system exists in each of the two entities. Serbs and 5 Croats. Their main task is to ensure that no law is passed by the House of Representatives unless all three nations agree on it. In practice this regulation has proved to be an obstacle to effi ciency at the state level and it is certainly a major reason why real power only rests with the state level to a minor extent. The Federation is administratively subdivided into 10 self-governing cantons [kanton/županija], which correspond to the NUTS-3 level of the EU classifi cation (see Figure 6 , 7 and Table 2 ). Each of these cantons has its own constitution, courts of justice, police forces, and legislative as well as executive competencies. In addition, they execute tasks on behalf of the Federation (delegated competencies). They collect taxes, supervise and co-ordinate the activities of their communes [opština/općina] and cities [grad]. In practice, the cantons are the most powerful ad ministrative layer in the Federation. They exceed the state as well as the federation level. This is partly due to their predominantly mono-national structure, which means blocs are rarely formed for national reasons. While fi ve cantons have a distinct Bosniak and three a distinct Croat population majority, only two are close to having an ethnic equilibrium (Cen tral Bosnian Canton [Srednjobosanski kanton/Srednjobosanska županija], Herze govian-Neretvan Canton [Hercegovačko-neretvljanski kanton]) (FEDERALI ZAVOD ZA STATISTIKU FBiH 2004). Only in the latter two cantons, do cantonal laws and decisions have to be approved by the delegates of both national groups (see Table 2 ).
The guiding principle for the defi nition of cantons was obviously the ethnic structure, while aspects of historical identities and functional coherence only played a secondary role.
Self-government in the cantons is executed by the one-cameral cantonal parliament [skupština kantona], which is elected for a four-year term by universal popular vote. A president [predsjednik] and two vice-presidents [potpredsjednik] are elected from among its members, who have to belong to different national groups. If a canton is practically mono-national, only one vice-president is appointed. The delegates do not only establish parties, but also form national clubs. The presidency proposes the prime minister of the cantonal government to the cantonal parliament, which, in turn, appoints the ministers of his government and nominates them for approval by the parliament.
The cantons are again subdivided into 3 to 13 self-governing communes [opština/ općina], in total 79 (see Figure 6 and 7) . In size (NUTS-4) and function they do not differ very much from the large communes in Communist Yugoslavia. However, boundaries have frequently been redrawn. Some new communes have emerged and communes that are split by a border that runs between two entities are governed in two parts.
The communes have a communal council [opštinko vijeće/općinsko vijeće] elected for a term of four years. The council in turn elects the communal government [opštinka uprava/općinska uprava] and the mayor [načelnik] . By Federation law it is possible that at least two communes agglomerate to a city [grad] under the precondition that one commune has at least 30,000 inhabitants or a central settlement has at least 10,000 inhabitants. So far, only four communes (Stari Grad, Centar, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo) in the urban region of Sarajevo have used this oppor tunity by joining to form the City of Sarajevo [Grad Sarajevo] . This means that they maintain all their communal functions and authorities, but delegate 7 members each into the city council [gradsko vijeće] of Sarajevo, which in turn elects a city government [gradska uprava] and a lord mayor [gradonačelnik] . The city exercises coordinating functions and operates facilities, which are in the common interest of its constituent communes. First of all, this is the uni-cameral National As sembly [narodna skupština] as the principal instru ment of self-government (see Figure 6 ). It is composed of 83 delegates elected by universal popular vote for a term of four years. A President [predsjednik] and two vice-presidents [potpredsjednik] are elected from amongst the delegates. The Government [vlada] answers to the National Assembly.
The President of the Republic [predsjednik repub like] and his deputy are also elected by direct popular vote, and, in this case, for a term of fi ve years. They have to stand together on the same ticket. The President is the supreme representative of the Republic, nominates the Prime Minister [predsjednik vlade] and the President [predsjednik] of the Supreme Court [ustavni sud], calls elections of the National Assembly and has the right to pass emergency decrees in special circumstances. Not only the direct democratic legitimacy, but also the fact that he is not part of a collective body com bining several nations, places the President of the Serbian Republic in a much stronger position than the President of the Federation.
The Republican Law on Territorial Organization and Local Self-Government adopted in 1994 and amended in 1999 (No. 35/99) defi nes 7 regions [regija] , into which the whole territory of the Re public is subdivided. So far they have not been acti vated, i.e. they have no active authorities and no functions and are consequently not depicted in Figure 7 . These regions are Banja Luka, Doboj, Bijeljina, Vlasenica, Sarajevo-Romanija (Sokolac), Foča and Trebinje.
The local administrative level (NUTS-4) is sub divided into 63 self-governing communes [opština/općina], two of which are cities [grad] . One city (Istočno Sarajevo), is composed of several com munes (Kasindo, Lukavica, Istočni Stari Grad, Pale, Sokolac and Trnovo), while the city of Banja Luka consists of just one commune and has the same competencies as "normal" communes. Istočno Sara jevo, on the other hand, functions in the same way as the City of Sarajevo on the other side of the entity border.
As is the case in the Federation, the local administrative level of the Serbian Republic corresponds very much to the communal structure of federal Yugoslavia. The small number of changes compared to the Yugoslavian period also took place more or less in parallel in the two entities.
Communes have a communal council [skupština opštine/skupština općine] elected for a term of four years, a communal government [opštinska uprava/općinska uprava] and a mayor [načelnik opštine/načelnik općine]. In a city [grad] , these bodies are named skupština grada, gradska uprava, and gradonačelnik, respectively.
The District of Brčko [distrikt Brčko], has the status of a neutralised zone within the territory of both entities, and is directly subordinated to the state. As institution of self-government it has an Assembly [skupština distrikta Brčko BiH], which is composed of 29 delegates elected for a term of four years. The Assembly elects the Government [vlada] and a Mayor [gradonačelnik] .
It is obvious that this four-tier administrative system (with a fi fth tier in Sarajevo) is extremely com plicated and also expensive. As it is also strictly based on national proportionality including veto rights for individual national groups making it possible to obstruct and block any decision, it favours mono-national situations and thus promotes national seg regation, which is already far advanced due to war and fl ight. The confederate state level is particularly affected by obstruction, while -with the exception of the local level -the mostly mono-national Serbian Republic as one of the entities works best in relative terms, as do those cantons within the Fe deration, which are also largely mono-national.
Montenegro [Crna Gora]
Cultural and administrative traditions
Montenegro's statehood can be traced back to Serbian principalities in the Early and High Middle Ages (Doclea, Zeta), when the territory of modern Montenegro was in fact a cornerstone of Serbian culture and state-building. From the 13 th century on ward its Adriatic coast was at least infl uenced, partly also controlled by Venice. During the 15 th century the Ottoman Empire acquired supremacy over the Montenegrin hinterland, without extending the military occupation across the entire territory.
The Venetian presence along the coast and the By zantine/Serbian/Ottoman shaping of the hinterland have had a strong and lasting impact on cultural identities. This division was not lessened by sub sequent developments, but instead it was accentuated: When Austria took over most of the coastal fringe from Venice in 1797 and kept it (with a short interruption) until 1918, it conserved the prevailing cultural and social climate. In the mountainous hinterland a small Montenegrin principality with Cetinje as its capital achieved formal autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in 1852. The Berlin Con gress of 1878 enlarged it considerably, also awarding it the southern section of the coast and made it formally independent. In 1910 Montenegro ac quired the status of a Kingdom, after the Balkan Wars (1912/1913) it shared the Sandjak of Novi Pazar [Novipazarski sandžak] with Serbia, and acquired southwestern parts of Metohija (including Pejë/Peć and Gjakovë/Đakovica) as well as narrow strips along the Albanian border.
Montenegro's full integration into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after World War I was not a problem, since, in the 19 th century, Monte negro had developed the identity of a second Ser bian state populated by the same ethnic majority group and sharing the same denomination.
Tito-lead Second Yugoslavia which, unlike the First Yugoslavia, did pay heed to the equilibrium be tween the Southern Slavonic nations, adopted, for this very purpose, a federal structure consisting of autonomous constituent republics with the corres ponding Southern Slavonic titular nations. Monte negro was given the position of one of six consti tuent republics with the state nation "Montenegrins". Just like the other constituent nations it was sub divided at the local level into large self-governing communes [opština] . Montenegro had 20 of these at the time of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Developments after 1991 and the current ad ministrative-territorial system
During the time of the Second Yugoslavia, the Montenegrins had also merely perceived themselves as a separate state nation, but not as a separate cul tural nation. Their Serbian national identity proved itself after the disintegration of Communist Yugo slavia, when they alone remained loyal to Serbia, continued to exist as federative constituent republic of rump-Yugoslavia and participated in all of its military and political activities.
A more distanced attitude did not take hold until the late 1990s, encouraged by the government of Milo Đuka nović, when it consolidated to a quest for indepen dence and ultimately found expression, amongst others, in a separate unit of currency, in a position of neutrality during the Kosovo confl ict and in the friendly reception offered to Albanian refugees from the Kosovo.
At the instigation of and through the mediation offered by the EU, which initially took a sceptical stance towards Montenegro's inde pendence, the Few changes have been made to the subdivision of the country into communes [opština] compared to the Yugoslavian era. Only the former commune Ivangrad was split into two in 1991 (Andrijevica and Berane), augmenting the number of communes from 20 to 21, with an average size of 658 sq.km and an average of 29,000 inhabitants (NUTS-4) (see Figure 8 ).
The new Constitution defi nes the communes as the basic units of the administrativeterritorial system, and allows for the possibility to establish additional levels of administration. The Constitution further concedes that the communes can defi ne their own statutes, but states that its communal authorities are to be the assembly [skupština] and the president [predsjednik] , and that they are to be fi nanced through self-generated revenues as well as by transfers from the state budget. The communes are further subdivided into 368 local associations [mjesna zajednica, MZ], which help to channel local interests, but have no elected bodies (see Figure 9 ).
There is no regional level of administration in Monte negro. This is mainly due to the large communes and the small size of the country. No other signi fi cant reasons can be determined. Considering this, the territorial administrative system of Montenegro is decentralized to an appropriate extent. Tito and Stalin (1948) , the Albanian Com munist Party chose to side with Moscow. This meant that, in contrast to the Self-Governing So cialism of Yugoslavia, Albania continued to follow a Stalinist and thus centralist path and it con sequently remained one of the most rigid political systems in the Communist bloc until the end.
During this time, the country was structured into 26 districts [rrethi] at the regional level and small communes [komuna] at the local level. Neither of these had self-government.
Following the political turmoil during the years up until 1997 and a period of domestic calming, the Albanian administrative system was not completed until 2000. Since then, it has been a three-tier system with 12 regions [prefekturë or qark] at the upper regional level (NUTS-3), 36 districts [rrethi] at the lower regional level (NUTS-4) since 1995, and 309 (rural) communes [komuna] and 65 towns [bashkia] at the local level (NUTS-5) (see Figure 10 ). Towns and communes are further subdivided into a large number (approx. 2,900) of villages or urban wards.
The 12 regions (see Figure 11 ) are endowed with indirect or delegated selfgovernment. Their councils are not elected by the region's population, but rather consist of delegates of the communes and towns (who are, in fact, elected).
The 36 districts (see Figure 11 ) represent deconcentrated state ad ministration. They implement the directives issued by the state and by the regions in their respective territories (HOXHA 2007) .
Only the local level (communes and towns) is self-governing. Both the councils and the mayors are elected directly by the population.
The lack of self-government at both regional levels can be led back to reasons that are generally appli cable to Southeast Europe. Additionally, it can be explained above Figure 10 : Albania's current administrative system Source: JORDAN 2010 all by the fact that the state does not wish to support the prevailing and pronounced clan structure, which has its own legal systems, by allowing self-government.
Respect for ethnic mi norities presumably also plays a part. While these are small according to offi cial fi gures (1989: 2%, INSTITUTI I STATISTIKËS 1991), experts estimate that they may account for approximately 10% (BËRXHOLI et al. 2003) and suggest that they would affi rm their identity in greater numbers in a minority-friendly climate (particularly Aromunians, Roma, Greeks). The fi ndings mentioned above as well as the synopsis shown in Figure 12 , suggest the following conclusions: The • local administrative level (NUTS-5; in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro NUTS-4) is endowed with self-government. This self-government has a longer tradition in Italy, has in the successor states of Yugoslavia been established already during the Communist years, and was adopted by Albania very soon after the political turn-around. This expresses the early quest for democratisation "from the grass roots", but with the small size of the local units it only embraces political dimensions that do not pose a threat to the central government. 
The
• regional administrative levels (NUTS-2 to NUTS-4), on the other hand, are exclusively self-governed only in exceptional cases. Italy introduced selfgoverning regions at the NUTS-2 level in 1970. Where, as in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina, this is the case in transformation countries, self-government is either endowed only with moderate competencies (Croatia) or it does not correspond to the ideal type of administrative regionalisation, but is rather a form of administratively supported and therefore solidifi ed ethnic segregation (Bosnia-Herzegovina: entities on the NUTS-2 level and cantons at the NUTS-3 level in the federation). Slovenia and Montenegro have no regions. This defi cit in the decentralisation process at the regional levels, in other words -with regard to a "real" administrative regionalisation -can be explained by administrative traditions, but beyond that also primarily by the poorly consolidated national identity and statehood. Against this background, different central administrations are keen to interpret various signs (ethnic and other minorities, pronounced regional identities, gravitational pull of foreign centres, socio-economic spatial disparities, etc.) as good reasons for demonstrating restraint in this matter.
Autonomies
•
, in the sense of partial territories of a state that are endowed with special competencies of self-government exist in the Italian share of the Adriatic space (Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige), but could not be established in the transformation countries of the Adriatic space, although regionalist movements (especially on Istria) were striving for them.
Administrative traditions
• display some impact. In Slovenia, deconcentrated state administration at the lower regional administrative level (NUTS-4) follows (like in other East-Central European countries) the pattern of the Political Districts during the end phase of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. The different approaches chosen by Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina can be partially (Croatia) or fully (Bosnia-Herzegovina) explained by the circumstances of war that prevailed in the 1990s. With the exception of Slovenia and Croatia, by the successor states of Communist Yugoslavia the self-governing large communes were retained at the lower regional level (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro). Slovenia and Croatia returned to small communes immediately after gaining independence, this being the structure that had existed there prior to the years of Communist Yugoslavia.
